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We show how on-the-job search and the propagation of shocks to the economy are
intricately linked. Rising search by employed workers in a boom ampliﬁes the incentives
of ﬁrms to post vacancies. In turn, more vacancies increases job search. By keeping job
creation costs low for ﬁrms, on-the-job search greatly ampliﬁes shocks. In our baseline
calibration, this allows the model to generate ﬂuctuations of unemployment, vacancies,
and labor productivity whose magnitudes are close to the data, and leads output to be
highly autocorrelated.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: E24, E32, J64
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Models with search frictions in the labor market cannot replicate the cyclical dynamics of 
vacancies and unemployment, even though these are central elements of such models. In 
particular, under realistic calibrations, one can explain the volatilities of these variables 
only with implausibly large shocks. The reason is that in a boom wage pressures rise 
strongly when the number of unemployed job searchers falls. This in turn reduces the 
incentives for firms to open new vacancies. One solution to this problem is to assume real 
wage rigidity, as proposed by Hall (2005), such that labor demand stays high in a boom. 
However, this leaves open the question why such real wage rigidity should arise in the first 
place. 
 
This paper proposes a simple solution to this puzzle, without the need to assume ad hoc real 
wage rigidity. We introduce the possibility that also employed workers search for jobs, so 
that vacancies can be filled with employees of other, less productive, firms that pay lower 
wages. In a boom, rising search activity by employed workers expands the pool of potential 
hires for firms, in addition to those searching from unemployment. This in turn reinforces 
the incentives to post vacancies by firms. But since all job searchers compete more strongly 
for the available vacancies, the wages of incumbent and newly hired workers rise much less 
than in the standard model.  
 
To make this argument precise and to assess it quantitatively, we develop a standard 
general equilibrium business cycle model with search frictions in the labor market. Search 
on the job is motivated in a straightforward manner by the presence of two types of jobs, 
which differ in the return to working. Workers in jobs that pay lower wages search in order 
to gain employment in high-paying jobs. Wages are determined by Nash bargaining for 
each matched job-worker unit and continuously renegotiated. We calibrate the model to 
match salient long-run empirical features of job and worker flows, such as average 
separation and quit rates.  
 
Our model can correctly predict the observed high volatility vacancies and unemployment, 
as well as of the vacancy-unemployment ratio. At the same time, the ratio of vacancies to 
unemployed and employed job seekers is substantially less volatile than in the standard 
model, which is key to wage dynamics. Thus wages are less volatile. In a boom, job-to-job 
flows increase substantially. But as search on the job rises, and firms’ wage and hiring cost 
increases are muted, the incentive to create vacancies remains high. Employed workers' 
search activity responds strongly to a positive aggregate shock to take advantage of the 
increased availability of good employment opportunities. The resulting fall in 
unemployment is large. This is achieved even though productivity shocks are of plausible 
magnitude and wages are, a priori, fully flexible. The model also predicts a vacancy chain 
in that replacement hiring for bad jobs rises with quits.  
 
This mechanism has important implications for business cycle analysis and monetary 
policy transmission. There is a powerful internal propagation mechanism, in that small 
aggregate impulses engender large and long-lasting responses of output and employment. 
This propagation is intricately linked with the complementarity between on-the-job search 
and vacancy creation. To the extent that labor costs include both wages and the costs of 
finding workers, on-the-job search delivers much lower volatility of real marginal costs in 
New Keynesian monetary models with monopolistic price setting. The sluggish response of 
wages and labor-market tightness that we find in the model will thus lead to more persistent 
movements in inflation.  1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Research starting with Hall (2005), Shimer (2005) and Costain and Reiter (2005) shows
that the search and matching models along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
can explain the cyclical dynamics of the labor market only by assuming implausibly large
productivity shocks. For reasonable calibrations, the standard framework underpredicts the
volatility of vacancies and unemployment. Both Hall and Shimer explore real wage rigidity
as a solution to this shortcoming. With this element, ﬁrms’ incentives to create new jobs in a
boom are kept high since workers do not share the returns through bargaining. Hence, more
vacancies are posted, and unemployment falls. This argument rests on the fact that the
vacancy-unemployment ratio enters the wage equation, reﬂecting workers’ outside options.
Thus, when wages are not rigid, but continuously renegotiated, they are excessively volatile.1
We show in this paper that on-the-job search oﬀers a resolution to this puzzle. In a
boom, rising search activity by employed workers expands the pool of potential hires for
ﬁrms, in addition to those searching from unemployment. As a consequence, the bargaining
power of incumbent and newly hired workers rises by much less than would be implied
by the standard vacancy-unemployment ratio. Wages exhibit less volatility than in the
standard model.
To develop this argument, we present a general equilibrium business cycle model with
labor market frictions and search by employed and unemployed workers. Search on the job
is motivated in a straightforward manner by the presence of two types of jobs, which diﬀer
in terms of proﬁtability and thus the returns to working. Workers in low-wage (‘bad’) jobs
search in order to gain employment in high-wage (‘good’) jobs. Good job vacancies can be
matched with employed and unemployed job seekers, whereas ﬁrms in the bad job sector
only hire unemployed workers. Wages are determined by Nash bargaining for each matched
job-worker unit and continuously renegotiated. We calibrate the model to match salient
long-run features of job and worker ﬂows.
Our model can correctly predict the observed volatility of the vacancy-unemployment
ratio. At the same time, the ratio of vacancies to unemployed and employed job seekers
is substantially less volatile, which is key to wage dynamics. Employed workers’ search
activity responds strongly to a positive aggregate shock to take advantage of the increased
availability of good employment opportunities. Job-to-job ﬂows increase substantially. But
as search on the job rises, and wage and hiring cost increases are muted, the incentive to
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July 2007create vacancies remains high. The corresponding fall in unemployment is large. This is
achieved even though productivity shocks are of plausible magnitude and wages are, a priori,
fully ﬂexible. Moreover, on-the-job search yields a powerful internal propagation mechanism
in that small aggregate impulses engender large and long-lasting responses of output and
employment. We show that this propagation is intricately linked with the mechanism that
keeps job creation high.
Important for the ability of the model to match the data is the interaction of two fea-
tures: the endogeneity of on-the-job search and vacancy creation. The former maintains
the incentives to create good jobs in a boom, since the likelihood of ﬁlling a vacancy re-
mains large, in spite of falling unemployment. The increasing availability of good vacancies,
raises employed workers’ search eﬀort. Without either element, the response of job-to-job
transitions and the propagation of shocks on output would be much weaker. This com-
plementarity explains the prolonged eﬀect of shocks. Furthermore, not only are more new
jobs created, but the job composition shifts towards more productive jobs, which raises
aggregate output.
The closest precursors of our model with on-the-job search are the contributions by Pis-
sarides (1994) and Mortensen (1994). The former studies a deterministic, continuous-time
model and qualitatively discusses possible adjustment dynamics. It shares the heterogeneity
in job types employed in this paper. The latter conducts a simulation of a stochastic ver-
sion of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model. Mortensen shows that on-the-job search
helps explain the negative correlation between job creation and destruction rates. In both
papers, employed search varies through adjustments in the number of searchers, rather than
the intensity of search. Finally, the two papers have exogenous interest rates and prices,
shutting down general equilibrium eﬀects, which aﬀect the dynamics of vacancies and unem-
ployment. Neither of the papers considers these dynamics quantitatively. Nagypal (2005)
considers the implications of on-the-job search motivated by subjective perceptions of job
quality by workers. While her analysis does not include aggregate propagation eﬀects, she
also ﬁnds large diﬀerences in vacancies and unemployment in a comparative statics exercise.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section gives a brief discussion of the relevant
evidence on the dynamic behavior of the labor market, in particular the quit rate. Section 3
lays out the model and characterizes the steady state. Section 4 gives the calibration details.
The results of the dynamic simulation of the model are presented in section 5, while section
6 contains further discussion and section 7 relates the ﬁndings to the literature. Section 8
concludes. The log-linearized model and remarks on the solution procedure can be found
7
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in the Appendix.2 The Empirical Background
This section documents the cyclical behavior of vacancies, unemployment, and labor market
tightness for the U.S. labor market and their relation to productivity, output, employment,
and real wages. While we use labor market data from 1948 until 2003, some other series
cover only a shorter period. In particular, the time series on average hourly earnings which
is only available from 1964 on and which we use as our measure of the real wage (deﬂated
by the CPI). All series are available from the website of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(www.bls.gov), except the series on quits, which has been compiled from the Employment
and Earnings publication of the BLS. This series, however, is only available up to 1982,
when it was discontinued. Vacancies are constructed from the BLS index of help-wanted
advertisements. All variables are quarterly and, where appropriate, detrended using the
HP-ﬁlter, with the smoothing parameter set to 1600.
The dynamics of vacancies and unemployment follow a familiar pattern. Figure 1 shows
vacancies that are highly procyclical whereas unemployment is strongly countercyclical;
that is, the two variables exhibit a Beveridge curve with a contemporaneous correlation
of −0.95. This pattern implies that a measure of labor market tightness, the vacancy-
unemployment ratio, is also highly procyclical. Table 1 presents the standard deviations
and cross-correlations of the variables of interest. Real wages are procyclical, the degree
of which depends on the time period considered.2 Particularly the 1970s feature a highly
procyclical real wage, while from the 1980s on it appears almost acyclical. In fact, for
the full sample, the correlation between output and real wages is 0.57, whereas from 1982
onward it is merely 0.26. For consistency with the theoretical model, we take output per
worker as a measure of labor productivity, which has a correlation with output of 0.69.3
One of the central variables for the argument considered in this paper is the rate of
job-to-job mobility and quits, which we consider to be the outcome of on-the-job search
activity. Two data sets have become available recently, but they only cover relatively short
periods of time. The Job Openings and Labour Turnover Survey (JOLTS) by the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics was begun in December 2000. This period essentially covers
only one mild downturn. Since 1994, the Current Population Survey uses a “dependent
interviewing” technique which allows construction of detailed worker ﬂow series. This series
2These results are not reported, but available from the authors.
3Output per hour has a correlation of 0.54 with output.
8
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dataset does not allow us, however, to infer unconditional time series properties of the data,
but it is at least useful in providing long-run averages.
A long time series on worker mobility and quits is contained in the BLS labor turnover
series for the manufacturing sector from 1926 to 1981, which we use from 1948 on. We follow
Blanchard and Diamond (1989) by making two adjustments based more recent numbers.
First, quit rates in manufacturing tend to be lower than in the entire economy and therefore
need to be adjusted upwards. We use Fallick and Fleischman’s (2004) ﬁnding based on the
CPS data. They ﬁnd an economy-wide average monthly quit rate of 2.6%. Some caution
may be mandated since the data cover only one upswing and one mild downturn. A long-run
average which includes a severe contraction might yield somewhat lower rates. Secondly, not
all quits are job-to-job ﬂows. Fallick and Fleischman (2004) suggest that job-to-job quits
are about half of total quits, while Blanchard and Diamond (1989) postulate 40 percent.
The standard deviation of the adjusted quit series can be found Table 1, based on the
sample up to the end of 1981. It is worth noting that the quit rate is eight times as volatile
as GDP and about 50 percent more volatile than unemployment.4 Figure 1 shows that the
quit rate appears to comove with the vacancy index, especially between about 1955 and
1975. In fact, the detrended series of vacancies and the quit rate for the whole period have
a correlation of 0.94. Increased availability of data from the CPS and JOLTS will allow
to test whether the volatilities short-run relationships between quits, unemployment, and
vacancies have signiﬁcantly changed since 1982.5
3 A Business Cycle Model with On-the-Job Search
Time is discrete and inﬁnite, and the economy is populated by a representative household,
homogeneous workers and heterogeneous ﬁrms. There are two classes of ﬁrms, labeled
‘good’ and ‘bad’, which diﬀer in their costs of creating new jobs. In the presence of labor
market frictions, these costs generate rents which give rise to diﬀerences across jobs in the
value of being employed.6 These diﬀerentials motivate workers in low-wage jobs to search
for employment in high-wage jobs. All workers in low-wage jobs search on the job. The
intensity of their search is endogenous. Unemployed workers direct their search to either
good jobs or bad jobs, according to the returns to search. Workers in good jobs have no
4See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2000) for evidence on the relative magnitudes of diﬀerent quit ﬂows.
5See Shimer (2005) for most recent evidence.
6In this respect, the model is similar to Pissarides (1994) and Acemoglu (2001). The key elements of the
model are the heterogeneity of jobs and the endogeneity of search intensity by employed workers.
9
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returns to employment. We ﬁrst characterize labor and product markets, and the aggregate
household problem. We then discuss the optimal choices by ﬁrms and workers in this
environment.
3.1 The Labor Market
The process of matching workers and ﬁrms is subject to frictions, represented by a matching
function, which gives the number of per period matches of job searchers and vacancies. The
matching function is constant returns to scale and homogeneous of degree one. It is the
same for both job types and searchers.7 For good jobs, the total number of per-period new







t + et), (1)
where v
g
t is the measure of good job vacancies, u
g
t the measure of unemployed workers
searching for good jobs, and et = stnb
t is the measure of eﬃciency units of search by
employed job seekers nb
t, who search with intensity st. Unemployed job seekers are assumed
to search with ﬁxed search intensity (equal to one)8. For bad jobs, the number of matches





Note that unemployed workers search in distinct pools for jobs, and have to make a decision
as to which type of job they devote their search eﬀort. Worker mobility implies that the
returns to search for either job type are equalized.
Central to the choices of ﬁrms and workers are the probabilities of ﬁnding a match for the










of labor market tightness in the matching markets for good jobs and bad jobs, respectively.

















. For searching workers, the probabilities of ﬁnding a good or






















7This assumption is usually based on empirical ﬁndings, such as those by Blanchard and Diamond (1990).
Note, however, that these estimates ignore the presence of job-to-job ﬂows. For a thorough discussion of the
potential biases see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
8This assumption will be relaxed below, and shown to have no substantive implications for the results.
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congestion for each other in the market for good jobs.9
Finally, the evolution of employment in good and bad jobs is governed by the equations:
n
g












where ρ is the probability of matches breaking up, which is exogenous and identical for
both types of jobs.10 It comprises both job destruction events and separations of workers for
reasons other than quits to another employer. The last term in the second equation can also







t, which is the fraction of new good matches that meet







For wage bargaining, we assume that a worker and a ﬁrm split in ﬁxed proportions





t −Ut,w h e r eJi
t is the value of a ﬁlled job for ﬁrms, V i
t the value of a vacancy, Wi
t
is the return of working to a worker, and Ui
t is the value of unemployment. The wage has
to be such that workers obtain a share Wi
t − Ut = ηSi
t, with bargaining weight 0 <η<1.
Firms receive the remainder Ji
t =( 1− η)Si
t. Wages are determined by taking the search
intensity of workers as given, while search intensity itself is chosen by workers taking as
given the current wage. Contracts are renegotiated each period.
3.2 Firms and Product Markets
The cost of creating a job is represented by a ﬂow cost of posting a vacancy, cg for good
ﬁrms, and cb for bad ﬁrms, where cg >c b. Production of a (representative) ﬁrm of type
i = g,b is given by the constant returns to scale technologies:
yit = Atni
t, (5)
where At is aggregate productivity and ni
t is employment in sector i. Output of good and




9This observation is consistent with empirical evidence, see for example Burgess (1995), but also the
discussion in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). In Pissarides’ (1994) model with on-the-job search, workers
cannot direct their search and are randomly matched across good and bad vacancies.
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July 2007T h et w oi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d s ,ygt and ybt, are sold at competitively determined prices, Pgt =
(1 − α)(ygt/yt)
−1 and Pbt = α(ybt/yt)
−1. We have chosen the price of aggregate output as
the numeraire. In the model, both types of jobs coexist in equilibrium.11
3.3 The Aggregate Household
We use a representative household to construct the discount factor that governs intertem-
poral decisions of workers and ﬁrms. We follow Merz (1995) and others in assuming that
workers are members of a large family which pools income and then redistributes it equally
to all members. The family ensures that all workers, employed and unemployed, participate











subject to the aggregate resource constraint:
ct = yt − ht, (8)
where 0 <β<1 is the household’s discount factor, and τ>0 i st h ei n v e r s eo ft h e




t are the aggregate hiring (or job creation) costs incurred by ﬁrms. From
the household’s problem we can construct the implied stochastic discount factor βt+1 =
βc−τ
t+1/c−τ
t , which ﬁrms and workers use to evaluate their activities.
3.4 Analytical Results: Job Creation, Search Intensity, and Wages
The optimal choices by ﬁrms and workers are governed by asset values. While the values
for good jobs and their workers are the same as in the standard search and matching model,
the values for bad jobs diﬀer in the presence of on-the-job search. The asset values of jobs
ﬁlled with a worker are given by the Bellman equations:
J
g












t = PbtAt − wb
t + Etβt+1
h
(1 − ρ)(1 − stp
g
t)Jb







t,i= g,b are the wages paid, Et is the expectation operator conditional on the information
s e ta tt i m et. Jobs survive into the next period with probability (1 − ρ), and are destroyed
11A similar product market structure is used by Acemoglu (2001). It can be interpreted as representing
diﬀerences across industries or diﬀerences across ﬁrms within industries. Evidence by Parent (2000), among
others, indicates that a large fraction of job-to-job transitions are within industries. This is suggestive of
intra-industry diﬀerences of jobs motivating worker mobility. Additional evidence comes from Albaek and
Sorensen (1998), who ﬁnd that ﬂows of workers in upturns typically are from small ﬁr m st ol a r g eﬁrms.
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search intensity by a worker reduces the likelihood of the job remaining matched in the
next period.
The value V i
t of a vacancy for either good or bad jobs, i = g,b, is:
V i









A vacancy is ﬁlled and produces in the next period with probability qi
t(1 − ρ). Free entry
implies that the values of vacancies are driven to zero at any point in time, i.e., V
g
t = V b
t =0 ,
for all t. Solving the asset equations for vacancies yields two job creation conditions, which











=( 1 − ρ)EtβtJb
t+1.
The equations relate the expected cost of a posted vacancy to the expected beneﬁt. To





It is then proﬁtable to post additional vacancies, v
g
t, w h i c hl e a d st oar i s ei nl a b o rm a r k e t
tightness θ
g




t). Vacancies rise until no ex-ante returns remain.




















(1 − ρ)(1 − stp
g
t)Wb







k(st) denotes the strictly convex cost of search intensity st, with k(0) = 0, k0 > 0,a n d
k00 > 0. The higher the search intensity, the more likely the worker is matched with a good
job. Convexity of the eﬀort function guarantees uniqueness of the optimal search eﬀort. For
st =0 , the worker either stays on the job or returns to unemployment after an exogenous
separation. Search intensity is chosen by the worker taking the wage as given, on grounds
that ﬁrms cannot directly observe the search eﬀort of workers. However, ﬁrms anticipate


















w h e r ew eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tci/qi
t =( 1− ρ)EtβtJi
t+1 =( 1− ρ)Etβt[Wi
t+1 − Ut+1](1 − η)/η
from bargaining. Thus, search intensity rises with the probability of ﬁnding a good job,
13
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would take place on bad jobs. The factor η/(1 − η) reﬂects the fact that workers obtain
only a share of the value of a job.12
The asset values of unemployed search for jobs of type i = g,b are
Ui
t = z + Etβt+1[pi
t(1 − ρ)Wi
t+1 +( 1− pi
t(1 − ρ))Ui
t+1]. (15)
From worker mobility, we know that U
g
t = Ub
t = Ut, for all t. Setting the asset values equal,
























Thus the relative labor market tightness for both types of jobs are exactly proportional to
the relative costs of job creation.
Finally, the wages paid in good and bad jobs are, respectively,
w
g





t = ηPbtAt +( 1− η)(z + k(st)) + η((1 − st)θ
g
tcg). (18)
The equations are derived from the bargaining relationship (1−η)(Wi
t −Ut)=ηJi
t,u s i n gt h e
respective asset equations and the job creation conditions.13 The second equation makes use
of equation (16). The wage compensates the worker for the incurred search cost k(st) and
compensates the ﬁrm for the increased likelihood of separation due to the workers search
eﬀort st.
4 Calibration and Model Solution
We proceed by linearizing the equation system around the non-stochastic steady state. The
resulting linear rational expectations model is then solved by the method described in Sims
12There is no role of the wage for reducing the likelihood of workers quitting, because of the timing
structure of the model and the nature of bargaining. Wages are continuously renegotiated so that currently
paid wages have no implications for wages paid next period, which will be newly negotiated. But next
period’s payments are what motivates worker search this period. If ﬁr m sc o u l dc o m m i tt ow a g e sf o rm o r e
than a period, then adjusting today’s wage would have an eﬀect on search intensity and thus quitting. We
exclude this possibility. This also allows us to determine the wage as an outcome to Nash bargaining, because
the bargaining set is convex. The need to determine the wage as the outcome of bargaining with alternating
oﬀers thus does not arise. See Shimer (2006) for a careful discussion.
13We assume at this stage that wages in previous jobs are not part of the outside options of a worker.
Alternative assumptions on the wage determination of job switchers is elaborated upon in Section 5.
14
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structural parameters. The calibration is somewhat more complicated than in the standard
model as aggregate statistics can not easily be matched with corresponding model statistics.
Moreover, since pertinent information is available for some parameters, we have to compute
these indirectly from the steady-state values of quantiﬁable endogenous variables. The
calibration is summarized in Table 2.
We choose a separation rate of ρ =0 .1. Following the argument in Den Haan, Ramey,
and Watson (2000), this value captures both exogenous job destruction as well as quits
into unemployment or movements out of the labor force. The unemployment rate is set
to 12%, i.e., u =0 .12. It is chosen higher than that commonly observed in the data
to take into account workers that are only loosely attached to the labor force, such as
discouraged workers or workers engaging in home production. Once the opportunity arises,
these (potential) workers participate in the matching market.14
We set the steady-state job-to-job transition rate to 0.06. In our model, this corresponds
to the term epg/n, i.e. the number of workers in bad jobs who move on to good jobs relative
to total employment. This number stems from the data on job-to-job quits as reported
above. When combined with the dynamics of employment, this implies a ratio of job-to-job
movements to total hires of 54%, which is at the high end of the empirically plausible range.
For the matching function, we choose a Cobb-Douglas form that is identical in both
sectors, so that mg = Mgv
1−μ
g (ug + e)




b. Similarly to the literature,
the elasticity parameter is calibrated as μ =0 .4.15 The level parameters Mg, Mb are
computed to imply an average ﬁrm matching probability of 0.7, which is a commonly used
value in the literature. This leads to Mg =0 .6 and Mb =0 .6. The corresponding steady
state sectoral matching rates, that is, the probability that a ﬁrm in the good or bad sector
ﬁnds an employee, are 0.77 and 0.63, respectively.
Job heterogeneity is generated by diﬀerences in the job creation costs cg >c b. Crucial as
these parameters are, it is also not trivial to pin them down. We let our choice be motivated
by the following considerations. First, job creation costs consist of costs for recruitment,
training, and unused capital, which are likely to be proportional to the capital intensity. In
fact, Acemoglu (2001) links creation costs to capital intensities in service and manufacturing
sectors. We thus impose that job creation costs for good ﬁrms are four times as large as for
14This argument is based on Blanchard and Diamond (1990).
15Empirical estimates of this elasticity parameter are biased when there is on-the-job search (see Petrongolo
and Pissarides, 2001, for the estimation). We are aware of no empirical study of the matching function that
takes on-the-job search into account.
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of average high-wage and low-wage jobs. Secondly, even though job creation costs can be
treated as scale parameters, they should not be out of line with the general steady state
implications of the model. Speciﬁcally, they cannot be so large as to substantially reduce
aggregate GDP below production. Setting cg =0 .16 and cb =0 .04 results in 5% of output
used in job creation activities and obeys the ﬁrst criterion. Furthermore, we impose that
sectoral prices are roughly equal in steady state which implies a share α =0 .4 of production
derived from bad jobs. Together with the diﬀerential in job creation costs, this implies that
wages are higher in good jobs.
The costs of searching on the job are assumed to be strictly increasing and convex in the
search intensity. We use k(s)=κsσ,w h e r eκ>0, σ>1. In our benchmark calibration we
choose σ =1 .5. We regard highly elastic search as the most plausible case. First, there may
be increasing returns to search as argued by Rotemberg (2006). Secondly, the model tries to
explain data generated by search at both the intensive and extensive margins.16 Note also
that Merz (1995) chooses a value of one. Since this is one of our main parameters of interest,
we will present and discuss the implications of variations in the search elasticity. The scale
parameter κ is not chosen independently, but is computed implicitly to be consistent with
the calibrated steady state. We ﬁnd κ =0 .04.
The parameters describing the household are standard. We choose a coeﬃcient of rela-
tive risk aversion τ =1 , and a discount factor β =0 .98. The worker’s share in the surplus
of the match is η =0 .5. There is no independent information available on the utility value
of household production z. Reverse calibration of the unemployment rate, however, implies
that z =0 .39, which is below wages in both sectors.
Finally, we need to calibrate the shock process. The (logarithm of the) aggregate pro-
ductivity shock is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with coeﬃcient ρA =0 .90.A s i s
common in the literature we choose an innovation variance such that the baseline model’s
predictions match the standard deviation of U.S. GDP, which is 1.62%. While this is not
a robust procedure, it is not essential for our approach since we do not evaluate the model
along this dimension. What matters are the relative volatilities of the variables of interest.
Consequently, the standard deviation of technology is set to σε =0 .0049.
B a s e do nt h i sc a l i b r a t i o n ,w eﬁnd that in the non-stochastic steady state equilibrium
about 30% of jobs are bad, and that search intensity s is about one third. In other words,
10% of the labor force are eﬀectively searching on the job. A relatively low number of
16Christensen et al, who estimate a search model with intensive and extensive search on the job, ﬁnd a
search elasticity of 2.
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(10.7%) search for bad jobs. This is the result of an endogenous response of the unemployed
to the competition for good jobs that they face with employed seekers. Vacancies relative to
the labor force (which is normalized to one) are 7.5 percent for good jobs, and 15.6 percent
for bad jobs.
The resulting match probabilities for ﬁrms are qg =0 .75 and qb =0 .57,w h i l ef o r
workers the probabilities to be matched with a good or bad job are pg =0 .43 and pb =0 .67.
Similarly, the ﬂow of new good matches per period is 0.057 and for new bad matches 0.092.
The larger amount of bad matches reﬂects the fact that the workers moving from bad to
good jobs are replaced at the industry level.17 We ﬁnally note that wages for good jobs are
slightly higher than for bad jobs, the diﬀerence being roughly 4%.
5M o d e l A n a l y s i s
We ﬁrst discuss the business cycle statistics generated from a simulation of the model,
followed by a characterization of the economy’s response to a productivity shock. We then
analyse in detail the sources of the propagation and ampliﬁcation mechanism at work in
the model.
5.1 Business Cycle Properties
We report labor market variables of interest in Table 3. Since the variance of the technology
shock was calibrated to match the standard deviation of U.S. GDP we only evaluate the
model’s predictions based on relative volatilities. We ﬁnd that, in general, the variables
in the model are only slightly less volatile than in the data, in particular, vacancies, un-
employment, and labor market tightness. Most notable, however, is the large discrepancy
between the standard measure of tightness θ = v/u and our alternative measure inclusive
of on-the-job seekers, e θ = v/(u + e). This suggests that on-the-job search has a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the model’s propagation mechanism, when compared to the standard framework,
as labor market tightness is the driving force behind ﬁrms’ vacancy posting decisions and
wage setting outcomes.
To wit, the aggregate wage is substantially less volatile than in the data which we
interpret as endogenously generated inertia in the absence of any ad-hoc wage stickiness
mechanism. Similarly, the volatility of the quit rate comes very close to what is observed
17The ﬂows in the bad job sector can be interpreted as either reﬂecting replacement hiring at the ﬁrm
level, or as job destruction in some ﬁrms, while others expand, holding total industry employment steady.
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additional searchers holds the ratio of vacancies to unemployment and employed search
relatively stable. At the same time, it keeps the incentives high for ﬁrms to post vacancies.
The simulation also yields strong predictions with respect to contemporaneous correla-
tions. First and foremost is the Beveridge curve, the negative correlation of unemployment
and vacancies over the business cycle. In U.S. data this correlation is −0.95,w h i c ha r e
able to replicate fairly closely.18 We also match the negative comovement of unemployment
with all other aggregate variables of interest. For instance, the unemployment rate is highly
negatively, though not perfectly, correlated with the job-to-job transition rate. When an
adverse technology shock raises unemployment, search intensity falls due to a declining job
ﬁnding probability. Workers are therefore less likely to engage in on-the-job search so that
relatively fewer workers in bad jobs move on to better ones. Interestingly, our two measures
of labor market tightness are perfectly correlated on account of the strong comovement of
search intensity with GDP. We also note the very high procylicality of job-to-job quits in
terms of the correlation with output. A noteworthy exception is the high correlation of
wages and on the job search in the model, in contrast to the data.
5.2 Impulse Responses
We illustrate the inﬂuence of on-the-job search on the model dynamics by using the impulse
responses reported in Figures 2 and 3. Consider a positive, one percent shock to productiv-
ity. On impact, aggregate output rises with productivity, followed by a protracted hump-
shaped increase until three quarters after the shock. At the same time, vacancies and labor
market tightness for both job types rise. As the probability of ﬁnding good jobs is now
higher, search intensity, and with it the eﬀective amount of on-the-job searchers, e, jumps
up. Vacancies for bad jobs rise by even more than for good jobs, because ﬁrms anticipate
the future ﬂows of workers to better jobs, which will have to be replaced. Unemployment
does not fall until the second period, as it takes time for new matches to be formed. The
unemployed redirect their search activity to low quality jobs, as they react to the increased
competition with employed searchers.
In the periods after the shock, diﬀerential eﬀects unfold along various dimensions. While
good vacancies begin to fall from their new higher level, bad vacancies further increase. This
i sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a ta se m p l o y m e n tr i s e sf o rb o t hj o bt y p e s ,m o r ew o r k e r sl e a v eb a dj o b s ,
requiring rising replacement hiring. Overall, the hiring rate rises for several more quarters.
18For their model, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) report a correlation of only −0.26.S e e a l s o t h e
interesting discussion in Shimer (2005).
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the chances of the employed to be matched with good jobs even more. Employment in the
good sector rises because the inﬂow of new workers exceeds the outﬂow from job destruction.
Even though the standard measure of labor market tightness θ = v/u is highly volatile,
wages rise by much less than without on-the-job search. The reason is that the measures of
labor market tightness relevant for the workers’ outside options that enter wage bargaining,
are substantially less volatile, as can be seen in Figure 3. The wage in bad jobs rises by
less, however, because of higher search intensity. While search has a positive impact on the
present value of the match for workers, it reduces the value of the match to ﬁrms.
We see from the impulse responses that changes in productivity have persistent eﬀects,
indicating that search on the job adds substantial propagation to the model. Similarly,
employment has a hump-shaped response. This is not caused per se by the heterogeneity
of jobs in the economy. Analysis of the model without employed search, as in Krause and
Lubik (2006), show that the impulse responses of that model are very similar to those of a
standard one-sector model, such as those by Andolfatto (1996) or Merz (1995).
5.3 Inspecting the Mechanism with On-the-Job Search
This sections digs deeper into the mechanism that generates the results of the model. We
argue that on-the-job search modiﬁes the standard model both in terms of ampliﬁcation
and propagation of productivity shocks in a qualitatively signiﬁcant manner.
5.3.1 Ampliﬁcation
Ampliﬁcation is most closely tied to the job creation condition (12) and the optimal search
condition (14). Rewrite the job creation condition for good jobs using the parameterization






μ =( 1− ρ)EtβtJ
g
t+1.
Our thought experiment is as follows. Suppose the expression on the right hand side in-
creases due to higher future productivity of jobs. This will cause ﬁrms to post more vacan-
cies until equality is restored. However, there is a contemporaneous eﬀect of higher vacancy
creation to employed job search, which further feeds back to vacancy creation.
The feedback between on-the-job search and vacancies can be deduced from inspection
of the optimal search condition. Using the sectoral arbitrage condition for unemployed
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Since cg >c b the term in squared brackets is between zero and one. Movements in labor
market tightness in the good jobs sector explain all variation in search intensity. An increase
in st in turn aﬀects θ
g












w h e r ew em a k eu s eo fet = stnb
t. Thus, for any increase in θ
g
t mandated by the job creation
condition, higher vacancy creation increases the amount of job search as implied by the
optimal search condition. This lowers tightness, and vacancies will therefore have to increase
further to meet the job creation condition. Alternatively, for a given increase in labor market
tightness, any increase in vacancies posted in the good sector further increases in the search
intensity of employed job seekers, by virtue of σ>1. This in turn induces ﬁrms to post
more vacancies. The process ends due to the decreasing returns inherent in the cost of
search.
There is a second feedback eﬀect, which works through the search behavior of the un-
employed. On impact of an aggregate shock to productivity, which aﬀects both types of
jobs, unemployed workers redirect their search eﬀort to the bad job sector. The reason is
the increasing competition with employed searchers for good jobs. Search for low quality
jobs will be relatively more attractive. Furthermore, as those who quit for good jobs will
have to be replaced, additional vacancies are posted.
5.3.2 Propagation
The propagation mechanism of on-the-job search can be explained through the evolution
of unemployment. In the standard model, lower unemployment reduces ﬁrms’ incentives
to post vacancies as fewer workers become available. With on-the-job search, the fall in
unemployment further raises the search activity of the employed. This keeps vacancy post-
ings higher than they otherwise would be. Adding the two equations for the evolution of
sectoral employment, the law of motion for total employment is:








Employment is increasing in the hiring rate p(θ
g
t). Moreover, for given ut search for bad jobs
rises with ub
t. Higher employment next period has a dampening inﬂuence, as ut+1 =1 −nt+1
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g
t) suﬃciently rises, and ub
t
does not fall, employment can rise further. Thus, the volatility of the hiring rate is crucial
for propagation.
Employment in the sectors evolves according to:
n
g













While next period’s employment in good jobs rises with the hiring rate and the number of
the unemployed searching for good jobs, employment in the bad jobs sector falls with the
amount of on-the-job search. As long as more of the unemployed search for bad jobs than
employed workers search for good jobs, employment can rise when the hiring rate rises.
Whether this is the case depends on how much prices continue to signal demand for the
output of the low quality sector.
Propagation of the initial shock thus works through two channels. One is the fall in
unemployment that arises from the surge in hirings in the period after the shock. The
other is the continued need to replace the workers who are ﬂowing to high quality jobs.
With unemployment falling substantially, ever fewer workers are searching for good jobs.
Indeed, as Figure 2 shows, most of the decline in unemployment shows up in the reduction
in searchers for good jobs. In contrast, search for low quality jobs does not fall. The falling
competition with the unemployed keeps the match probability, and thus the incentive to
search on the job, high for employed job seekers.
6 Discussion and Robustness
We now discuss the robustness of the results with respect to aspects of the calibration and to
a number of extensions, speciﬁcally the calibration of the search elasticity and endogenous
intensity of unemployed search.
6.1 The Role of Search Intensity
Why does the cyclicality of job-to-job quits change the behavior of the economy so substan-
tially? This is best understood as the result of an interaction between rising search eﬀort
and the heterogeneity of vacancy postings. On the one hand, rising search eﬀort raises good
ﬁrms’ incentives to post vacancies. Without employed searchers, the creation of good jobs is
constrained by the fall in the number of unemployed searchers and the strong rise in wages.
On the other hand, the increasing availability of good jobs further encourages on-the-job
21
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and posting vacancies, which explains that unemployment falls substantially even though
competition with employed job seekers rises. Only slowly do these incentives fall back to
their steady state levels.
The role of search intensity can be illustrated by varying the elasticity of search eﬀort.
The results are depicted in Figure 4, which shows the standard deviation of measures of
labor market tightness and the quit rate. As σ approaches one from above, the quit rate and
labor market tightness become exceedingly volatile. Since the responsiveness of search costs
to changing search eﬀort declines, the volatility of job-to-job quits rises. Even though the
standard and our modiﬁed measures of labor market tightness, θ = v/u and e θ = v/(u+e),
are almost perfectly correlated, their volatility is strikingly diﬀerent. While the former
is very responsive to changes in σ, the latter is barely aﬀected. The reason is that as
unemployment falls, employed search rises, keeping the incentives for vacancy creation high
after a favorable aggregate shock. The theoretical counterpart in our model, vg/(ug + e),
behaves similarly.
As is evident from the impulse responses, the presence of time-varying on-the-job search
activity leads to persistent movements of output after shocks to technology. The elasticity of
search is, however, only partially responsible for the propagation mechanism in the model.
Even with ﬁxed search intensity, productivity shocks are still ampliﬁed and propagated in
a hump-shaped manner. At the same time, the volatility of vacancies and unemployment
falls, as Figure 3 illustrates.
We investigate this issue further by analyzing modiﬁcations to our benchmark speciﬁca-
tion. The impulse response of output is depicted in Figure 5. First, we shut down on-the-job
search over the business cycle. That is, we impose st = s, ∀t. While there is still employed
search in the steady state - and optimally chosen according to Eq. (14) -, workers are not
allowed to adapt their search intensity to changing business cycle conditions. Secondly, we
remove the possibility of on-the-job search entirely, thereby only preserving the two-sector,
good job/bad job structure. We see clearly the complete lack of propagation in the standard
search and matching model.19
The endogenous persistence due to on-the-job search is therefore helpful in explaining
the autocorrelation patterns in U.S. data. Figure 6 depicts the autocorrelation functions of
U.S. GDP growth rates over the period 1948:1-2002:4 and for the three model speciﬁcations
discussed above. The lack of propagation in the model without on-the-job search is well
19It is this inability of the search and matching model that has been widely discussed in the literature
(see, for instance, Den Haan et. al., 2000).
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other hand, captures U.S. output dynamics remarkably well, even slightly overpredicting the
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation. But even when search intensity is constant, the autocorrelation
pattern by far outperforms the standard model without on-the-job search.20
6.2 Endogenous Search Intensity of the Unemployed
In the model, the key mechanism is the increasing ﬂo wa n ds e a r c ha c t i v i t yo fe m p l o y e d
job seekers. At the same time, the search intensity of unemployed workers is ﬁxed. We
argue that this asymmetry does not generate our results. Conceivably, as unemployed
search activity rises, their incentives to search for good jobs stay high, thus competing more
strongly with the employed searchers. In one-sector models with endogenous search activity
(Merz, 1995) this element tends to worsen model performance. In our on-the-job search
framework, the mechanism that expands search on-the-job is the fall in unemployment. If
unemployed workers were to search more intensively, the unemployment pool would deplete
even faster, thus further amplifying the importance of search for employed workers.
It is fairly straightforward to include endogenous search intensity of the unemployed in
the baseline model. The asset value of unemployment becomes:
Ui
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As for employed search, search intensity of the unemployed is directly proportional to labor
market tightness for good jobs. Furthermore, dividing the conditions for unemployed and












Assuming the same search cost functions, this condition implies that employed and unem-
ployed search intensity move proportionately in response to shocks.
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of the unemployed. Deﬁne ut = su




t. If anything, changes in employment are further ampliﬁed, as can be seen from
the employment equation:








ut rises, too, as does ub
t. For given θ
g
t, employment will rise faster. While this may reduce
the periods in which employment and output further rise, it does amplify the impact of
the shock. It is not the case that endogenous search of the unemployed works against the
eﬀects of on-the-job search.
6.3 Wage Setting Arrangements and Real Wage Rigidity
For expositional clarity, we excluded the possibility that employed workers who contact a
good ﬁrm may be in a stronger bargaining position. As long as the previous job serves as











t >U t. The superscripts ‘e’a n d‘ u’ indicate the diﬀerent values for W
g
t when
workers fallbacks diﬀer. Since there is continuous renegotiation, the wages accruing to the
worker would fall next period, as the worker cannot return to the previous job. Thus the
diﬀerence in value during negotiations must be paid lump sum. Such a ‘signing bonus’
above the wage normally negotiated would have to be Bt = Wb
t − Ut.21
A signing bonus has two eﬀects on the equilibrium. On the one hand, it increases
the incentive for employed workers to search. The higher search intensity would somewhat
reduce the value of bad jobs, and thus lower Wb
t . On the other hand, good ﬁrms who can not
distinguish between unemployed and employed workers before contacting them. Therefore,
ceteris paribus, vacancies posted would fall due to the probability of having to pay the
bonus. This would dominate rejecting the worker and searching another period. How these
two eﬀects aﬀect the cyclical response to shocks is not clear, even if they reduce on balance
the amount of job-to-job ﬂows.
A second issue is whether turnover can be reduced by higher wages. Such an ‘eﬃciency
wage’ may be pareto improving, since the reduction in turnover increases the total value of
the match. The simple surplus splitting would no longer be equivalent the Nash bargaining
21We assume here that the previous employer does not make counter-oﬀers, which is not plausible on
empirical ground and has been argued not to be in the interest of ﬁrms. See Moscarini (2005) and for
example, Christensen et al. (2005). But note that Cahuc et al. (2005) use exactly such setup to derive a
theory of the wage distribution.
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that this problem does not arise in our model, because ﬁrms cannot aﬀect the current match
value by oﬀering a higher wage now. The reason is that workers search behavior is governed
by returns to search which accrue only in the next period. Thus the ﬁrm should commit
to higher wages in the future. With continuous renegotiation, such a commitment cannot
be made. Therefore the bargaining set under this assumption is convex and current wage
increases are not pareto-improving, so the Nash bargaining solution remains applicable.
Only if we were to allow for (at least one-period) wage stickiness can a higher wage in the
next period aﬀect turnover decisions today.22
Wage rigidity would not only potentially give rise to ‘eﬃciency wages’ but also substan-
tially aﬀect the dynamics of the model. It would complement the ampliﬁcation of vacancies
and unemployment and the propagation of shocks. This follows for the reasons emphasized
by Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005): rigid wages for new hires keeps the incentives for ﬁrms
to post vacancies higher as a tightening labor market does not feed back into wages. The
volatility of wages, which is already lower in our model with on-the-job search, could be
reduced with smaller degrees of real wage rigidity than in the standard model. But the
eﬀects of on-the-job search would not be aﬀected.
7 Relation to Previous Work
In many other models, employed search is mainly varied at the extensive margin and possibly
a lump sum is paid for searching. Recent contribution along these lines are Cahuc, Postel-
Vinay, Robin (2005), Nagypal (2005), and Moscarini (2005). Pissarides (2000) is an early
example for this modeling strategy. Jobs diﬀer by idiosyncratic productivity levels, drawn
from a continuous distribution. With workers choosing whether to search or not, this
implies two thresholds in terms of productivity. Below the higher threshold workers have
an incentive to search for better employment, participating in the common matching market.
New matches start at the highest possible productivity. Below the second threshold, the
joint value of the match with the ﬁrm is below the parties’ outside option, leading to job
destruction. Since all jobs are created at the highest possible productivity level, vacancies
are the same for employed and unemployed workers. The key diﬀerence of our model is the
search at the intensive margin, and the persistent diﬀerence between job types. Including
22See Shimer (2006) for a discussion of wage setting in the presence of on-the-job search, and the nature
of pareto-improving wage setting when ﬁrms can commit to future wage payments.
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Pissarides’ (1994) search model with on-the-job search shares the presence of two dif-
ferent job types, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ with ours, and features random search for jobs. An
interesting feature is the accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. Just as idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity draws, this generates heterogeneity in worker productivities across jobs. Implied
is also a threshold in the tenure of workers above which workers do not switch jobs, because
starting wages in good jobs are lower than the wage in bad jobs. Thus search is also at
the extensive margin, search intensity is constant. Furthermore, relative prices and the
interest rate are constant. In Pissarides’ model employed job search reduces the volatility
of unemployment. Thus this model would not help understand the Hall-Shimer ﬁndings of
a substantial volatility of the unemployment rate.
Mortensen (1994) simulates a stochastic version of the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994)
model, with the addition of on-the-job search, modeled at the extensive margin. The pres-
ence of employed search helps in explaining the negative correlation between job creation
and destruction. The model also features a procyclical quit rate, with workers being ran-
domly matched to the most productive jobs. Both Pissarides (1994, 2000) and Mortensen
do not explore prediction of their models for the joint dynamics of vacancies, unemployment
and job-to-job ﬂows or the eﬀects on wages.
A second class of models with on-the-job search consider the possibility of endogenous
wage distributions arising in the presence of frictions.24 However, these models are steady
state models, and are based on wage posting. This means that wages do not respond to
shocks and are not renegotiated. Burdett and Mortensen (1999) explore the link with inter-
industry and ﬁrm-size wage diﬀerentials. Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, Robin (1999) estimate such
a model and show how it accounts for a steady state distribution of wages. Christensen et
al. (2005) estimate a similar model with endogenous intensity of search. We do not know
of any example in the literature that analyses dynamic, that is, stochastic versions of these
models.25
A ﬁnal note on the literature that confronted the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
model with the data. It typically focused on the performance of the model along the
dimension it was designed to explain, namely the behavior of job creation and destruction.
For example, Cole and Rogerson (1999) ﬁnd that the model performs well if the steady-
state unemployment rate is high. The argumenti st h a tt h er e l e v a n tp o o lo fs e a r c h e r si n
23See Hussey (2005) for such a model.
24A key reference is Mortensen (2003).
25See also Shimer (2005) who reports that no such analysis has been conducted.
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persistent idiosyncratic shocks in a business cycle model of this type comes at considerablethe labor market is high, based on the ﬁndings of Blanchard and Diamond (1990). Den
Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) achieve plausible job ﬂows by modeling endogenous job
destruction along with capital. As mentioned, Hall (2003) and Shimer (2003) are the ﬁrst
to consider the ability of the search and matching framework to quantitatively match the
cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies. In all papers, the performance of the
model is enhanced by an assumption that reduces the cyclicality of hiring costs or wages.
In our model, it is the presence of employed search.
8C o n c l u s i o n
We have presented a model of labor market and aggregate dynamics and in which search
on-the-job plays a crucial role. It is possible to explain the joint dynamics of vacancies,
unemployment, and productivity without resorting to any imperfection other than search
and matching frictions. In particular, we do not require wages to be rigid in order to
bring the model closer to the data. Instead, in a cyclical upswing, increased search eﬀort
by employed workers serves to hold their outside options tame, and keeps costs of job
creation more stable for ﬁrms. Endogenously, wages are less volatile, and incentives to post
vacancies remain high. Unemployed workers incentive to direct search to jobs where they
do not compete with employed searchers further amplify these eﬀects.
The model delivers a rich description of the labor market over the business cycle. Booms
are times which allow employed workers to upgrade into better jobs, while opening jobs for
unemployed workers, albeit of lower quality. The reallocation of labor to more productive
units is facilitated by direct job-to-job transitions, rather than requiring movements of
workers through the unemployment pool.26 One fundamental reason for worker mobility is
the heterogeneity of jobs which gives rise to persistent diﬀerences in the returns to workers.
The creation of good jobs is ampliﬁed by the rising intensity of search by employed workers.
The propagation that the model implies may have important implications for business
cycle analysis. In the response to a positive productivity shock, output peaked after a
number of quarters, not in the ﬁrst period, as the process for productivity suggests. A
higher match probability induces employed workers to search for better jobs. This feeds
back into the incentives for ﬁrms to continue posting vacancies for a protracted period.
26Ad i ﬀerent interpretation of the demand structure also comes to mind. The good job-bad job distinction
might better be reﬂecting old and new jobs in a vintage model. In that case, search on the job could accelerate
the creation of new vintages at the technological frontier. It would also induce destruction of less productive
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for search high. Only slowly does this eﬀect appear to fade. Interestingly, we obtain a
propagation of shocks that is similar to Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), even though
we do not include capital or a variable destruction rate.
However, the ﬁndings are not meant to rule out an potentially important role for (real)
wage rigidity. Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) suggest this as a solution to the empirical
diﬃculties they identiﬁed with Mortensen-Pissarides model. Also in our model, wage rigidity
would further amplify the cyclical response of vacancies, unemployment and job-to-job ﬂows.
Hall (2005) has made an interesting advance modeling wage setting based on social norms,
which allows wages even for new hires to be rigid. In previous work, we applied this idea
in a monetary business cycle model with search frictions.27 The model can also be seen
as complementary to work by Nagypal (2005), in which on-the-job search is motivated by
workers’ perceived match quality. Booms are times where workers are more willing to move
to other jobs because of the increased likelihood of ﬁnding a better match (independent of
actual productivity). This in turn increases the incentives for ﬁrms to post vacancies.
27Krause and Lubik (2007).
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4. Evolution of employment:
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10. Sectoral and aggregate output:
yg,t = Atn
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b At = ρA b At−1 + εAt
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July 2007Table 1: U.S. Business Cycle Statistics
YWNY
N UV θ Q R
Standard Deviation
1.62 0.69 0.81 0.83 6.90 8.27 14.96 9.81
Cross-Correlations
YWNY
N UV θ Q R
Y 1 0.57 0.82 0.69 -0.87 0.92 0.91 0.91
W — 1 0.27 0.66 -0.42 0.51 0.47 0.05
N — — 1 0.16 -0.93 0.88 0.91 0.91
Y
N — — — 1 -0.34 0.49 0.43 0.44
U — — — — 1 -0.95 -0.98 -0.93
V — — — — — 1 0.99 0.94




Working Paper Series No 779
July 2007Table 2: Model Parameters and Calibration
Parameter Value Description
μ 0.4 Match Elasticity
Mg 0.6 Level Parameter
Mb 0.6 Level Parameter
cg 0.16 Good Job Creation Cost
cb 0.04 Bad Job Creation Cost
ρ 0.1 Separation Rate
σ 1.1 Search Elasticity
η 0.5 Nash Bargaining Share
α 0.4 CES-Weight
β 0.98 Discount Factor
τ 1 Intertemporal Substitution Elasticity
u 0.12 Unemployment Rate
ζ 0.06 Quit Rate
z 0.39 Value of Home Production
κ 0.04 Search Cost Function Parameter
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July 2007Table 3: Benchmark Simulation
Standard Deviations
YW NY
N UV θ θ n QR
(rel. to Y )
1.62 0.19 0.56 0.27 6.09 5.43 11.17 2.57 10.05
Cross-Correlations
YWNY
N UV θ Q R
Y 1 0.83 0.99 0.97 -0.99 0.93 0.99 0.96
W - 1 0.81 0.86 -0.75 0.97 0.88 0.94
N - - 1 0.54 -1.0 0.87 0.97 0.92
Y/N - - - 1 -0.54 0.84 0.87 0.96
U - - - - 1 -0.87 -0.97 -0.92
V - - - - - 1 0.96 0.99
θ ---- - -1 0 . 9 8
QR ---- - - - 1
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Figure 1: Vacancies, Unemployment and Quits
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Productivity Shock
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Productivity Shock
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Figure 4: Search Elasticity and Aggregate Volatilities
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Constant Search Effort
No On the Job Search  
Figure 5: Impulse Responses of Output to a 1% Productivity Shock
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Figure 6: Autocorrelations of Output Growth Rates
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